



Statechains: Off-chain Transfer of UTXO Ownership



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What Statechains Achieve



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- L2 scaling by avoiding on-chain transactions



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- L2 scaling by avoiding on-chain transactions
- Advantage over Lightning:
 - unrestricted coin movement (has synergy)
- Advantage over Federated Sidechains:
 - federation doesn't have full control
- Unique limitation: can only move full UTXO amount



What Statechains Build On

- Schnorr signatures
- Adaptor signatures
- Eltoo
- Graftroot



What Statechains Build On




- Schnorr signatures
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Works on any cryptocurrency that supports the above



High-level Overview


1 BTC





High-level Overview


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
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
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
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
High-level Overview

- Change UTXO ownership off-chain
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- A can collude with prior owners (B, C)
- Collusion/cheating always provable






Bob locks up 1 BTC with Alice...





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



...but who owns it?

Bob owns it






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
on-chain

off-chain


Can Bob transfer this off-chain to Carol?




Can Bob transfer this off-chain to Carol?
Sort of, but Carol has no control over it



So Bob uses a transitory key X instead



So Bob uses a transitory key X instead
and passes the key on to Carol





The role of the statechain entity (A)




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


Schnorr:
 $A1+A2+A3=A$



The role of the statechain entity (A)

- Promises to *only* cooperate with the last owner
- Can be a federation ◦ ◦ ◦
- Updates the statechain:
 - listing all UTXOs it controls (no duplicates)
 - every transfer has a signature (e.g. B to C)




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Bitcoin




1 BTC



Bitcoin


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
Bitcoin

Statechain

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
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

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


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


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


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


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
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
eltoo





Problem: who goes first?




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
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
Statechain entity A goes first...?




User B goes first...?




Solution: Adaptor Signatures




Everyone shares an incomplete signature



Completing the statechain signature...



...automatically completes the bitcoin signature





Security Model

Bitcoin: A + X

Statechain: ~~B~~/~~C~~/~~D~~ / E (knows X)

Owner: *Prev.* *Last*



Security Model

<i>Bitcoin:</i>	$A + X$
<i>Statechain:</i>	$B + C + D$ / E (knows X)
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- Moving the coins always requires the permission of:
 - a. Statechain entity A (typically a federation)
 - b. a transitory key holder (who held the UTXO)



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- Entity must cooperate with **LAST** transitory key holder
- Failure to do so will produce evidence of fraud



Worst case scenario



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Harmless without transitory keys (weak assumption):

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
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
Harmless without transitory keys (weak assumption):

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- Court order to freeze/confiscate coins


Swapping to smaller amounts



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Possible with other coins





Microtransactions

“Anything smaller than an economically viable UTXO”



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- Required if Statechain entity wants to charge fees



Microtransactions

“Anything smaller than an economically viable UTXO”

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Microtransactions


“Anything smaller than an economically viable UTXO”

- Required if Statechain entity wants to charge fees
- Needed when swapping between multiple currencies
- Ideally solved without trusting the statechain entity
(important legal reason: no custody over ANY coins)



Lightning Channel Creation



1 BTC




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


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
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Lightning Channel Creation





Lightning on Statechains



Lightning on Statechains

- Channel updated together with multi atomic swap



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- Small channels: up to the amount of the smallest UTXO



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- Uncooperative close similar to regular Eltoo



Lightning on Statechains

- Channel updated together with multi atomic swap
- Small channels: up to the amount of the smallest UTXO
- Uncooperative close similar to regular Eltoo
- Close/reopen channel low-friction: it's all off-chain!
(e.g. adding/removing bitcoins)



Potential Use Cases



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- Off-chain value transfer



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- Platform for Lightning channels



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- Betting channels (multisig, Discreet Log Contracts)



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- Off-chain value transfer
- Platform for Lightning channels
- Betting channels (multisig, Discreet Log Contracts)
- Fork-agnostic ETF (UTXOs don't move)



Further topics



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- Non-interactive version



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- Use HSM to transfer transitory key (attestation)



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- Non-interactive version
- Use HSM to transfer transitory key (attestation)
- Graftroot withdrawal (allows redeeming forks)
- Succinctly store and relay statechain (per UTXO)
- Variant using blind signatures:
 - Entity unaware which UTXOs it holds (unblind p2p)

Paper: goo.gl/RWQ4ue

Email: rsomsen@gmail.com

Twitter: [@SomsenRuben](https://twitter.com/SomsenRuben)

Thank You

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Thank You


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


Bitcoin





Bitcoin



Statechain

